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Abstract
This paper focuses on the eﬀect of auditing activity on corporate per-
formance. To this end, an auditing measure is derived for six countries
based on their national auditing laws. A study is then made of the im-
pact of this legislation on corporate values in the market. The findings
show that auditing rules positivly aﬀect company performance. This link
is then confirmed with several robusteness checks.
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1 Introduction
Corporate failures involving large and well known companies in the last twenty
years have led to renewed discussion on the role of corporate governance in the
operating of financial market mechanisms. Scandals 1 have also concerned audit
firms failing in their role of monitoring corporate accounts, suggesting that an
accurate consideration of the true meaning of auditing is also required. In recent
financial literature, a series of studies have applied a legal approach to corporate
governance to focus on investor protection and its aﬀects on both development
of the financial market and corporate valuation. In this strand of literature,
seminal contributions are due to Shleifer and Vishny (1997)2 and La Porta et
al. (1998). In the former work, the authors point out that corporate governance
∗This paper is part of the project on Governance supervised by Prof. Bagella. The author
is grateful to Prof. Bagella and Prof. Becchetti for their comments and patience. Other
thanks go to Rocco Ciciretti, Diana Nicoletti, Nazaria Solferino, Giovanni Trovato, Robert
J. Waldmann and an anonymous referee for conversation and comments. Any defects in this
paper remain the sole responsibility of the author.
†E-mail address: elena.d.agosto@uniroma2.it
1 In the late of 1990s, numerous corporations were involved in scandals. Notorious cases
included : WorldCom, Enron, Tyco.
2Henceforth, it is denoted as LLSV.
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consists of mechanisms that assure that outside financiers of a company get a
return on their investments. This statement entails the possibility that agency
problems may arise in the wake of a conflict of interest between managers and
shareholders. The authors also document that diﬀerences among countries in
terms of investors protection laws are due to the legislative bases of a partic-
ular country, and that the degree of protection is associated with diﬀerences
in the development of financial markets across countries. Indeed, LLSV (1998)
find that common law countries have stronger laws and enforcement than civil
law countries, which in turn are characterized by weaker laws and enforcement
mechanisms. As a result of these features, the authors argue that common law
countries have more developed financial markets than civil law countries.
Further steps in this strand of literature focus on the eﬀect of investor protec-
tion on corporate valuation (Claessens et al.,1999; Johnson et al.,2000; Gorton
and Schmid, 2000;La Porta et al., 2002). A common result of these studies is
that companies have higher market values in economic systems with reliable
rules protecting their investors.
Finance scholars admit the importance of auditing in investor protection.
As Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesized, auditing is a mechanism for mon-
itoring the parties involved in the management of a firm. Indeed, in agency
models, auditing aims to alleviate the asymmetric information between man-
agers (agents) and outside investors (shareholders as principals) in order to
align the interests of the agents to those of the principals and to reduce the
incentive for an opportunistic behaviour. Auditors’ financial reporting intends
to prevent that false information from aﬀecting share prices.
In spite of this, scholars attention to the implication of auditing activity
on financial markets has been scarce. Conversely, accounting literature has
recognized its role in corporate governance as an enforcement mechanism in the
verification of accounting data (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) for some con-
siderable time. Historical evidence on auditing activities has documented that
companies previously employed reputable auditors to assure outside investors of
the credibility of accounting information and hence mitigate the agency problem
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1983).
This paper intends to contribute to the financial literature analysing the
role that auditing has (as an investor protection instrument) in determining the
corporate market valuation. To this end, this study works in accordance with
the legal approach to corporate governance. We recall a few contributions in the
area of financial literature devoted to the audit issues, since we refer to them in
order to carry out our analysis.
Interestingly, Newman, Patterson and Smith 3 (2005) suggest a simple model
to present the auditing issue. The authors extend the model of Shleifer and
Wolfenzon4 (2002) on the role of investor protection, adding auditors services.
Their hypothesis is based on the assumption that the ability of legal jurisdi-
tion to protect the interests of investors depends on the enforcement of law in
3Henceforth, it is denoted as NPS.
4Henceforth, it is denoted as SW.
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detecting and detering the violations of their rights. Auditing aims to detect
expropriation by insiders (managers or controlling shareholders). NPS (2005)
link investor protection to auditors incentives to detect insider expropriation.
These incentives take the form of penalties for failure to detect irregularities.
The authors find that an increase in the auditor’s penalty leads to an increasing
external investment of capital. Moreover, increases in the insiders penalty for
detecting expropriation lead again to an increase in total investment of capital.
NPS (2005) assess the implication of the model empirically. They show that,
for instance, countries with higher auditor penalties and insider penalties have
higher total investment level and more dispersed ownership.
Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2003) argue that the degree of investor protec-
tion creates, as a consequence, a consistent demand for timely and transparent
accounting and auditing in corporate governance. Their empirical analysis sug-
gests that civil law countries have less demand for auditing than common law
ones. Also they find that civil law countries with relatively transparent/ timely
accounting procedure have a greater demand for auditing compared with the
other civil law countries.
Fan and Wong (2005) study the nexus between auditor choice and company
value in emerging markets. These are characterized by high ownership concen-
tration which may be the signal of a weak legal environment (also shown in
LLSV, 1998). As a consequence of concentrated ownership, agency problems
may arise. Scholars find that firms oppointing high quality auditors are asso-
ciated with higher firm valuation. From the few contributions proposed in the
literature, diﬀerences in the peculiarities of economies make the investigation of
audit activity eﬀects on financial development an interesting empirical issue.
Our study aims to take a step towards filling this gap in the financial lit-
erature namely the implication of auditing activity on financial market. Our
contribution is twofold. First we use a new and original measure of auditing
quality to document the variation among countries. This original measure pro-
vides evidence of how a country’s auditing standards are the direct consequence
of investor protection laws5. Second, we show that investor protection laws, in
terms of auditing quality, have an eﬀect on corporate performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review prior re-
search about the eﬀect of both corporate governance and investor protection on
company value, in order to identify how literature deals with this relationship.
In section 3, we present our analysis. We introduce our measure of audit quality,
the control variables and the source of data; next, we illustrate the estimation
method and econometric findings. Section 4 considers several robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing the empirical results.
2 Review of theoretical and empirical literature
Prior theoretical and empirical studies on the investor protection and corporate
performance relationship do not provide homogenous results. However, there
5For detailed indications, see also D’Agosto (2005).
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are few contributions and new reaseach should yield further evidence. In this
section we provide a short literature review dealing with the issue. The seminal
paper of La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) has provided the bases
for research on the law and finance nexus. Their main results show that laws
concerning investor rights vary a great deal across countries, to some extent as a
consequence of diﬀerences in legal origin. In turn, the legal environment aﬀects
the quality of enforcement of legal rules. They oﬀer empirical evidence which
shows that common law countries have stronger enforcement than French civil
law countries. The authors find that countries with poor investor protection
develop a higher concentration of ownership as a substitution mechanism for
the lack of legal rules for defend their rights.
In LLSV (1997), the authors find strong evidence that the legal environment
has large eﬀect on the size and breadth of capital markets across countries.
There are few works devoted to theoretically modelling the role of legal envi-
ronment in corporate finance (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Hart, 1995; Friedman
and Johnson, 2000). Through a simple model, LLSV (2002) show the eﬀects of
both corporate ownership structure and investor protection on firm valuation.
As law and finance literature states, common law countries have better investor
protection which, in turn, creates higher corporate valuation. Moreover, they
empirically find that companies with controlling shareholders have higher val-
uations in common law rather than civil law countries. Shleifer and Wolfenson
(2002) set up a market equilibrium framework of corporate finance in the pres-
ence of weak shareholder protection, in which they demonstrate many empirical
regularities. A better legal environment in terms of investor protection gives
rise to lower ownership concentration along with more larger and valuable firms.
Moreover stock markets are more developed in countries with better protection
for shareholders. A similar setting is presented in the empirical work of Jong,
Gispert, Kabir and Renneboog (2002). They seek to understand how diﬀerences
in corporate governance systems lead to diﬀerences in corporate performance.
Although they find a variation of across countries common corporate governance
characteristics (i.e. board size, ownership structure), specific corporate gover-
nance features of a country play an important role in determining corporate
performance relative to the common characteristics. A diﬀerent approach is
applied by Daines (2001). This paper provides evidence that corporate law in
Delaware State results in an improved firm value. Delaware State attracts most
of the public firms in the U.S. and this fact revealed particularly convinient
conditions for incorporated firms in this State6. Daines’ original contribution,
compared to previous studies, consists of collecting a large sample of US firms.
The author provides consistent evidence that state law aﬀects corporate value.
Delaware firms show a positive and significant relationship to Tobin’s Q, used
as a performance measure. These results are robust when measured against a
variety of controls.
Some areas of the literature deal with the relationship with specific aspects
6This is because firms are run according to the rules of the state in which they are incor-
porated.
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of corporate governance (mechanisms to control the agency problems between
manager and shareholders) and company value. Other empirical papers take
into account general measures of corporate governance, such as Black, Jang and
Kim (2003). The authors find a positive relationship between a composite cor-
porate governance index and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for firm performance, within
a sample of Korean public companies. Once more, similar results are provided
by Klapper and Love (2003) for a sample of firms in emerging markets. Gom-
pers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) construct an index, at company level, based on
the existence or not of provisions, laws or regulations related to the takeovers.
Interestingly these authors find that corporate governance and firm value are
highly correlated. Stronger shareholder rights are positively associated with
higher firm performance, after many robusteness checks.
Drobetz et al. (2004) also focus their analysis on corporate level governance.
For a sample of German public listed companies, they create a measure of
the firm level governance quality on the basis of survey questions and study its
relationship with corporate performance. The results show that better corporate
governance is highly correlated with better operating performance, higher stock
returns and higher market valuation. A similar approach has been employed
by Beiner et al. (2004) in the case of Swiss listed companies. They develop
a firm-specific corporate governance index and add other control mechanisms
(leverage, outside blockholdings, board size, the fraction of outside directors on
the board) in the analysis. The results are consistent with the hypothesis of a
positive link between corporate governance and company value.
Each of these papers has focused on specific aspects of legal investor pro-
tection but not involving auditing issues. In the next paragragh we present an
empirical assessment of the nexus between auditing as an investor protection
mechanism and corporate valuation.
3 Auditing quality and corporate performance
In this section we empirically explore whether a country- level auditing measure
aﬀects firm valuation, considering our original measure as a proxy for an investor
protection mechanism in a given country7. We intend to estimate our hypothesis
within the legal framework proposed by La Porta et al. (1998).
The auditing quality in a country is obtained by first creating an appropriate
database and then adopting a specific statistical methodology to derive the
index. We assess our hypothesis by applying two measures of corporate value
and diﬀerent specification methods.
7A very preliminary study of this link is suggested in Auci and D’Agosto (2004).
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3.1 A measure of auditing quality
In this paragraph we briefly describe how we derived our audit dimension, re-
ferring to D’Agosto8(2005) for more details.
Firstly, we have sought legal sources for audit regulation in each country
investigated. Then we have listed a set of characteristics suitable for represent-
ing the audit rules framework operating in a country, basing the selection of
attributes on the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). This Act, issued by the U.S Par-
liament in the wake of numerous US corporate failures, estabilished standards
for all US. public company boards, management and accounting firms. Using
this law, we consider several main auditing characteristics to compare the au-
dit regulations in the other countries. Further we have checked these features
over a period of twenty years in order to capture the changes in the regula-
tions. The list of attributes has been grouped into three clusters denoted as:
Supervisory Authority, Auditors Independence and Corporate Responsibility.
The first group lists key issues concerning the authority that oversees auditing
firm activities. The second cluster describes several aspects related to Auditors’
Independence and the last group illustrates aspects of Corporate Responsibility
in the audit process (see table 7).
To compare audit regulations across countries, we first turn each of the audit
rules into qualitative variables. To this end, we create variables which assume
value 1 if the specific audit rule is present in the country legislation and zero
otherwise. We obtain a matrix of binary variables called the indicator matrix.
We repeat this exercise for each year of the sample period from 1980 to 2002
turning out a total indicator matrix which consists of 132 rows (22 years times
6 countries) and 22 columns (qualitative variables). The total matrix represents
our auditing database.
We then explore the data collection by mean of a suitable technique: multiple
correspondence analysis. This statistical technique allows the reduction of the
listed characteristics into a small number of attributes (latent factors).
This multivariate method is accurate for the study of qualitative data and
add features of not assuming an underlying distribution and not hypothesising
a model for the data (Greenacre, 1984). This procedure allows an overview
of the fundamental relationships among the variables and removes irrelevant
information. In broad terms, correspondance analysis explores the structure
of associations among a set of qualitative variables and brings out underlying
dimensions which can be interpreted as latent variables. The dimensions we
derived from the analysis identify a profile of the country audit legislation over
time. We have derived this measure in D’Agosto (2005) and denoted it as degree
of regulation guarantees. This represents our assessment of audit quality in the
country. The label applied to this measure means that the information it sum-
marizes is related to the definition of rules which specify the supervisory and
auditing activities. Indeed, this latent variable includes rules concerning stan-
8This paper gives more details on methodological aspects of building audit measure and a
detailed procedure on how to perform it. See "Auditing Issues across countries: an explorative
approach to the Regulation Framework".
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dards of auditing and quality control, others related to powers and duties of the
authority and regulations on auditors’ independence with respect to the certi-
fied firms. There is then a measure for each country over time which expresses
how country legislation, compared to other nations, assures investor protection
through rules regulating contents and actors involved in auditing activities.
3.2 Data sources and Variables description
Our empirical analysis on the relationship between audit quality and corporate
valuation is restricted to the six countries for which our audit dimension has
been derived. The United States and the United Kingdom (denoted as com-
mon law countries) and France, Germany, Spain and Italy (denoted as civil law
countries). The corporate data source for these markets is DATASTREAM,
from which we have selected 1830 firms listed in national stock exchanges. Our
sample is composed of: i) 500 from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); ii)
550 from the London Stock Exchange (FTSE index) ; iii) 250 from the French
Stock Exchange (FCHI); iv) 250 from the German Stock Exchange (GDAXI);
v) 120 from the Spanish Stock Exchange and finally vi) 160 from the Italian
Stock Exchange (MIB). The data was collected yearly from 1980 to 2002. We
take into account Tobin’s Q and Market-to-Book ratio for corporate valuations.
Tobin’s Q represents the firm’s market value divided by its replacement cost.
We estimate this ratio as the market value of assets (calculated as book value of
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity) over book value of
assets. Market-to-book ratio has been taken directly from DATASTREAM and
is defined as market value of equity over book value of equity. From the main
literature on corporate governance, we have selected a list of appropriate control
variables as follows: the logarithm of book asset value denoted as ln(ASSETS) is
considered as a control for firm size. Our debt-equity ratio is defined as the ratio
of total debt to capital, where capital is total debt plus equity. This measure
of leverage focuses on the capital employed and best represents the eﬀects of
financing decisions, denoted as LEVERAGE. We include BETA as a measure of
riskiness of a firm. Return on assets (ROA) is a measure of a firm’s profitability
and we only consider its current value. To capture the eﬀect of legal origin we
introduce a dummy variable (LEGAL) which assumes value one if the firm is
in a common law country. Finally, we add our auditing variable (Auditindex).
This denotes our original measure of the quality of the audit in the country:
the grater the value of the measure, the lower the quality of auditing in that
country. Conversely, a decreasing value of the index expresses an increasing
country auditing quality.
In table 1 we summarize financial characteristics of the firms in the sample
while in tables 2 and 3 we provide descriptive statistics for the sub-samples,
respectively common law and civil law countries. The latter two tables show
that there are significant diﬀerences in the samples. Mean Tobin’s Q diﬀers a
great deal when we compare common law to civil law countries. Similarly, other
variables report higher figures such as Beta, Roa. On the other hand, leverage
values are lower in common law than in civil law countries. Table 4 lists the
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correlation matrix for our explanatory variables.
3.3 Estimation methods and econometrics findings
This subsection reports the estimation strategies and outcomes of the empirical
analysis. Before addressing econometric issues we sum up our estimation hy-
pothesis as follows. According to the framework of La Porta et al. we deem
that legal investor protection influences corporate valuations. We also argue
that enforcement mechanisms as auditing rules may influence corporate market
performance; it is proposed that company valuation will be higher in markets
(countries) which are more inclined to put such mechanisms in force.
This hypothesis is tested by using the following equation:
ln(fmv)ijt = β0+β1ln(asset)+β2leverage+β3beta+β4roa+β5legal+β6Auditindex+ijt
(1)
where ln(fmv)ijt is the logarithm of the variables taken into account as firm
values respectively Tobin’s Q and Market to Book Value(MBV); ln(asset) is the
logarithm of book asset value; leverage is a measure of the debt-equity ratio;
beta is a measure of firm risk; roa is the return on assets; legal specifies if a
firm is in a common law country; Auditindex is our audit quality dimension in
a country.
In order to test this hypothesis we have to plan suitable estimation tech-
niques. In this respect an important issue is to account for the law varibility
over time of the auditing variable. To take advantages of our longitudinal data
we control for the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. We apply a random
eﬀects model as a consequence of the few changes over time in the auditing
rules; this could lead the fixed eﬀect alternative to force the identification of the
auditing coeﬃcient or to drop variables due to multicolinearity. The random
method uses variation both within and between countries to estimate its eﬀects
on valuation, but does not treat firms in a given country as independent obser-
vations. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect the cross correlation between
observations due to common country components.
In table 5 we present comparative results for both firm valuation variables
(Tobin’s Q and MBV) of the random estimates, where we also account for sector
dummies. In the same table we also show pooled estimates. The Breusch-Pagan
test rejects the null hypothesis that errors are independent within countries,
that is individual eﬀects are important. As far as the explanatory variables
are concerned we obtain the following findings. The logarithm of ASSETS is
positive and significant when either Tobin’s Q or the MBV ratio is used as
the independent variable. The coeﬃcient on LEVERAGE is positive but only
significant in the case of MBV as the independent variable, as found in Black,
Jang, and Kim (2003). The LEGAL dummy variable captures the valuation
eﬀect for firms belonging to common law countries. The LEGAL coeﬃcient is
always positive and significant in both dependent variables. To be a firm in
a common law country appears to assure better performance than in civil law
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nations. Turning to the auditing variable, its significant coeﬃcient shows that an
increase in the quality of auditing (that is, a reduction in the auditing measure)
positively aﬀects both Tobin’s Q and Market to Book Value. This result is
slightly more pronounced if Tobin’s Q is used as the dependent variable. We also
take sector dummy into account in both specifications. We confirm all results
for the previous models even though slightly less accentuated. For our purpose
it is interesting that the audit rating is robust once these control variables are
considered.
From the outcomes of this preliminary examination we deduce that country
audit characteristics seem to aﬀect market valuation of the firms, a fact which
remains true, after also controlling for country legal origin.
4 Robustness check
In this section we examine whether the previous results concerning our key
variable are robust when compared to other alternative econometric specifica-
tions. The first of these concerns a recent methodology developed by Plumper
and Troeger 9 (2004) to treat comparative political variables which present law
time variation. There are no standard methods in the econometric literature
to deal with the problem of time-invariant variables. Usually, it is avoided
by controlling for fixed eﬀects because the unit eﬀect dummies and the time-
invariant variables are perfectly collinear. An alternative procedure is to run
random eﬀects (in spite of inconsistant estimates) 10 , as we have done; other-
wise, disregarding individual eﬀects, a pooled OLS model can be run . All these
procedures, in the presence of time-invariant variables and unit eﬀects, suﬀer
from drawbacks. Plumper and Troeger (2004) suggest a method for treating
time invariant variables which comes out less biased than others listed above.
We apply this technique, the results for which are summarized in the first col-
umn of Table 6. The coeﬃcient for our key regressor, the auditing variable, is
confirmed in its sign and significance. Also the coeﬃcient related to country
9The technique developed by Plumper and Troeger consists of a vector decomposition
procedure that allows us to estimate time-invariant variables in an augmented fixed eﬀects
approach. The model consists of three stages: in the first stage we run a fixed-eﬀects model,
in the second stage the unit-eﬀects vector is decomposed into a part explained by the time-
invariant variables and an error term and in the third stage we re-estimate the first stage
including the time invariant variables and the error term obtained in stage 2 by pooled-OLS.
The authors assess the small-sample properties of the procedure and compare them to
the pooled OLS, random eﬀects and Hausman-Taylor. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate
that xtfevd is on average less biased than the available alternatives. Moreover, xtfevd has
better small sample properties than Hausman-Taylor. At the same time it is less biased than
random eﬀects and pooled OLS when unit eﬀects are correlated with time-variant variables.
xtfevd outperforms pooled OLS and random eﬀects in estimating timevariant variables that
are correlated with the unit eﬀects (ui) and it is more adequate than Hausman-Taylor in
calculating the eﬀect of time-variant variables that are correlated with the unit eﬀects. Thus,
employing the unit fixed eﬀects vector decomposition technique appears to be superior for the
analysis of data generating processes typical for panel data in comparative politics.
10Another alternative procedure is to apply the Hausman - Taylor technique but its results
are strictly related to control variables employed.
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legal origin validates the previous outcomes. Moreover, we control for cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White Sandwich estimator. As a
further check we apply (see Table 6, column 2) a Generalized Estimating Equa-
tion (GEE) which corrects for error term correlation over time without reducing
the number of observations in the case of unbalanced data. It is also the case
here that country auditing quality seems to aﬀect Tobin’s Q.
An important issue that arises in the analysis of corporate governance and
firm valuations nexus is the endogeneity problem. If corporate governance, in
our case at country level, was endogenously determined, we could not make an
assessment of the causal link. Countries which have higher firms market values,
e.g. more developed stock markets, could simply be more likely to define better
auditing rules. Accordingly, there is a causal relationship, but ordinary least
square coeﬃcients will tend to overstate the actual connection.
One way to mitigate the problem of causality is to add appropriate control
variables. Specifically, to test whether the relationship between our auditing
dimension and corporate valuation could be spuriously caused by some omitted
variables, we added variables which are supposedly associated higher auditing
rankings. Our auditing variable has a low variation over time but allows us to
address the issue of causality using the instrumental variable method. There
is a strand of the financial literature which links financial market development
with economic growth (see i.e. Levine and Zervos, 1998). We adopt the gross
national product per capita as an instrument. In table 7, we show the results of
this specification. Econometric outcomes show the existence of a significant and
positive relationship between auditing quality and firm performance, confirming
the validity of the previous analysis.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the eﬀect of national auditing rules on corporate per-
formance. We analyzed yearly company observations in six countries during
the period 1980-2002. We derived an original auditing measure that allows us
to assign an audit quality score to each country within the sample. We have
shown that quality auditing rules positivily aﬀect company performance. We
have shown that this link is confirmed even when the endogeneity is taken into
account. Furthermore, the overall results are consistent across the diﬀerent spec-
ifications. Thus, the findings suggest the importance of considering institutional
factors such as auditing rules when formulating policies in investor protection.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics on the overall sample 
Variables N Mean Std. dev Min Max 
TOBIN’S  Q 17338 377.8592 5423.347 -6808.846 536125.7 
BETA 41538 0.8900905 0.2786561 0.2050008 8.221819 
ROA 16365 3.009591 95.61497 0 11655.18 
MVB 23288 5709.231 155873.8 -594.29 7415316 
MVTOT 23861 4.14E+09 7.74E+10 6.24 7.28E+12 
BVSTOT 19582 2.05E+07 1.82E+08 -1.39E+08 1.44E+10 
TOTAL ASSET 21947 1.23E+07 4.74E+07 37 1.10E+09 
TOTAL DEBT 21932 3947419 2.15E+07 0 8.51E+08 
TOT.SH.CAP. RES 21938 1817236 4519667 -9951000 1.45E+08 
LEVERAGE 21919 0.3923619 1.437953 -94.28176 175.4943 
LEGAL 42090 .5737705 0.4945338 0 1 
AUDITINDEX 42090 0.1825548 0.6426865 -1.1035 0.8285 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics Common law Sample 
Variables N Mean Std. dev Min Max 
TOBIN’S Q 10931 527.1521 6750.516 -6808.846 536125.7 
BETA 23874 0.9024002 0.2200128 0.2050008 2.004893 
ROA 10989 4.451394 116.6562 0 11655.18 
MVB 15454 8166.095 186221 -594.29 7415316 
MVTOT 15135 5.51E+09 9.61E+10 64 7.28E+12 
BVSTOT 12561 3.16E+07 2.26E+08 -1.39E+08 1.44E+10 
TOTAL ASSET 12736 1.21E+07 4.65E+07 376 1.10E+09 
TOTAL DEBT 12724 3762033 2.27E+07 0 8.51E+08 
TOT. SH. CAP. RES. 12727 2195143 5212378 -1670000 1.45E+08 
LEVERAGE 12711 0.3782553 1.870126 -94.28176 175.4943 
LEGAL 24150 1 0 1 1 
AUDITINDEX 24150 0.5062076 0.4157277 -1.1035 0.8285 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics Civil law Sample 
Variables N Mean Std. dev Min Max 
TOBIN’S Q 6407 123.1503 1321.917 -3.789874 47461.74 
BETA 1766 0.8734532 0.3416095 0.4484704 8.221819 
ROA 5376 0.0624235 0.5640196 0 34.49863 
MVB 7834 862.616 61509.51 -88.43 5318500 
MVTOT 8726 1.75E+09 1.87E+10 6.24 6.86E+11 
BVSTOT 7021 791125.2 3429937 -9107196 8.11E+07 
TOTAL ASSET 9211 1.25E+07 4.86E+07 37 9.26E+08 
TOTAL DEBT 9208 4203592 1.99E+07 0 4.24E+08 
TOT. SH. CAP. RES 9211 1295075 3262582 -9951000 6.10E+07 
LEVERAGE 9208 0.4118351 0.3060643 -7.687813 5.722189 
LEGAL 17940 0 0 0 0 
AUDITINDEX 17940 -0.2531316 0.6368592 -1.0482 0.8285 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
 TOBIN’s Q A S S E T M V B R O A B E T A LEVERAGE LEGAL AUDITINDEX 
TOBIN’s Q 1        
ASSET 0.0027 1       
MVB 0.0175 -0.0049 1      
ROA 0.5644 -0.0075 0.0013 1     
BETA 0.0445 0.0865 -0.0054 0.0076 1    
LEVERAGE 0.0049 0.0467 -0.001 -0.0021 0.0017 1   
LEGAL -0.0038 0.0360 0.0221 0.0216 0.0514 -0.0115 1  
AUDITINDEX 0.0074 -0.001 -0.0026 -0.0003 0.0498 -0.0039 0.5843 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Pooled and Random Estimation Methods: coefficients for Tobin’s Q and Market Value to Book 
(MVB) 
Annual data for the period 1980- 2002. Dependent variable (Tobin’s Q or MVB). Tobin’s Q represents the firm's market value divided by its 
replacement cost. We estimate this ratio as the market value of assets (calculated as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market 
value of equity) over book value of assets. Market-to-book ratio has been taken directly from DATASTREAM and is defined as market value of 
equity over book value of equity; ln(ASSETS) is the logarithm of book asset value; LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to capital; 
BETA is a measure of riskiness of a firm; ROA, Return on assets is a measure of a firm's profitability (current value); LEGAL is a legal origin 
dummy which assumes value one if the firm is in a common law country; Auditindex denotes our original measure of the quality of the audit in 
the country: the grater the value of the measure, the lower the quality of auditing in that country. Conversely, a decreasing value of the index 
expresses an increasing country auditing quality. 
 
POOLED indicates pooled OLS; RANDOM states for random effect model; RANDOM Adj. states for random effect model adjusted for sector 
dummies. 
 
 TOBIN’S  Q MVB 
 POOLED RANDOM RANDOM Adj POOLED RANDOM 
RANDOM 
Adj 
       
ASSET 0.12995*** 0.49413*** 0.50203*** -0.00682** 0.04002*** 0.04675*** 
 (0.00803) (0.01233) (0.01244) (0.00339) (0.00738) (0.00739) 
LEVERAGE -0.01358 0.00149 0.00157 -0.14401*** 0.28374*** 0.29212*** 
 (0.02407) (0.00652) (0.00626) (0.02749) (0.06632) (0.06659) 
BETA 1.70506*** 1.75042*** 1.72904*** 0.59186*** 0.74231*** 0.66335*** 
 (0.07203) (0.24141) (0.23916) (0.03183) (0.09993) (0.09691) 
ROA 0.00098*** 0.00040 0.00040 0.00002 0.00004 0.00004 
 (0.00022) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00006) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
LEGAL 2.57863*** 2.38043*** 2.25411*** 0.36662*** 0.41719*** 0.36518*** 
 (0.03843) (0.09373) (0.09395) (0.01770) (0.04132) (0.04056) 
AUDITINDEX -0.37857*** -0.21113*** -0.20611*** -0.08001*** -0.09741***  
 (0.02809) (0.02304) (0.02319) (0.01269) (0.01303)  
       
Sector dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Constant -1.19795*** -6.29017*** -6.31717*** 0.17001*** -0.75680*** -1.01192** 
 (0.12993) (0.25637) (0.29515) (0.05247) (0.12080) (0.13433) 
       
Observations 14502 14502 14501 15819 15819 15818 
R2 0.32 0.24 0.06 0.03   
       
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Robustness checks 
Annual data for the period 1980- 2002. Dependent variable (Tobin’s Q or MVB). Tobin’s Q represents the firm's 
market value divided by its replacement cost. We estimate this ratio as the market value of assets (calculated as book 
value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity) over book value of assets. Market-to-book 
ratio has been taken directly from DATASTREAM and is defined as market value of equity over book value of 
equity; ln(ASSETS) is the logarithm of book asset value; LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to capital; 
BETA is a measure of riskiness of a firm; ROA, Return on assets is a measure of a firm's profitability (current value); 
LEGAL is a legal origin dummy which assumes value one if the firm is in a common law country; Auditindex 
denotes our original measure of the quality of the audit in the country: the grater the value of the measure, the lower 
the quality of auditing in that country. Conversely, a decreasing value of the index expresses an increasing country 
auditing quality. 
 
FEVD indicates Plumper and Troeger method; GEE states for  Generalized estimating equation  model; IV states for 
instrumental variable  model : instrument: GDP per capita 
 
 TOBIN’sQ 
 FEVD GEE IV 
    
ASSET 0.59896*** 0.49074*** 0.49981*** 
 (0.00315) (0.02349) (0.00987) 
LEVERAGE 0.00190 0.00148 0.00158 
 (0.00289) (0.00458) (0.00490) 
BETA 1.48048*** 1.75205*** 1.72255*** 
 (.026316) (0.22853) (0.19651) 
ROA 0.00011*** 0.00041** 0.00043*** 
 (0.00003) (0.00017) (0.00010) 
LEGAL 2.78364*** 2.38324*** 2.26862*** 
 (0.01259) (0.10508) (0.09053) 
AUDITINDEX -.675890*** -0.21387*** -0.08044*** 
 (0.00957) (0.02789) (0.02502) 
Constant -7.84854*** -6.24551*** -6.28358*** 
 (0.050238) (0.35948) (0.22171) 
    
Observations 14502 14502 14502 
R2 0.85   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 7: List of audit characteristics 
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY 
INDICATOR 
AUDITORS 
INDEPENDENCE 
INDICATOR 
CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY INDICATOR 
∼ Juridical nature of authority ∼ Prohibited Activities 
∼ Audit Committees: 
responsibility and 
independence 
∼ Duties of the Board ∼ Audit Partner Rotation 
∼ Corporate Responsibility 
for Financial Reports of 
National and Foreign Firms 
∼ Composition ∼ Conflicts of Interest 
∼ Improper influence on 
Conduct of Audits 
∼ Members Independence  
∼ CEO and CFO reimburse 
the Issuer due to non-
compliance of financial 
reports 
∼ Vacancies 
  
∼ Powers and Rules of Authority 
∼ Registration with the Authority 
∼ Auditing Standards 
∼ Quality Control Standards 
∼ Independence Standards and Rules 
∼ Inspections of Registered Public 
Accounting Firms 
∼ Authority Review 
∼ Investigations and Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
∼ Applicability to Foreign Public 
Accounting Firms 
∼ Oversight of Supervision Authority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Values of the audit indicator by country 
Anni USA France Germany Italy Spain UK 
1980 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1981 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1982 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1983 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1984 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1985 0.84 0.43 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.42 
1986 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1987 0.84 0.43 -0.85 0.32 -0.57 0.42 
1988 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1989 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1990 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.24 
1991 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.24 
1992 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1993 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1994 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1995 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1996 0.84 0.16 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1997 0.84 0.16 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1998 0.84 0.03 -0.85 -0.83 -1.05 0.09 
1999 0.84 0.03 -0.85 -0.98 -1.05 0.09 
2000 0.84 0.03 -0.85 -0.98 -1.05 0.09 
2001 0.84 0.03 -1.01 -0.98 -1.05 0.09 
2002 -1.09 0.03 -1.01 -0.98 -1.05 0.09 
 
